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            TenThe Bridge (continued)
  11
            June 1863: Wars and Rumors of WarsTwo
            days later, the invasion rumors began. Much of the gossip
            was generated over a comment, mostly unsubstantiated at the time,
            made by Union Cavalry General Alfred Pleasonton on the day after
            the large cavalry clash at Brandy Station, Virginia. The battle on
            the grassy plains of Culpeper County, Virginia began about dawn,
            a few scant hours after the northbound train carrying one hundred
            and thirty anxious African American men and boys pulled out of the
            Market Street station in Harrisburg, one hundred and fifty miles
            to the north. The distance between the two points would prove to
            be much less reassuring than it might have seemed at the time.  Within
          hours, nearly 19,000 horse soldiers would clash in the mightiest cavalry
          battle of the war. When the smoke cleared at the end of the day, the
          Confederate forces still held the field, but the Union cavalrymen,
          who up to that point in the war had been judged as vastly inferior
          soldiers on horseback, brutally demonstrated to their Southern foemen
          how much they had learned over the winter.  On
          Wednesday, 10 June, the day after the battle, a jubilant and confident
          Major General Pleasonton declared that Confederate General J.E.B. Stuart’s
          cavalry “was intended for Pennsylvania and Pittsburgh.”100 Although
          Pleasonton’s information was hearsay—intelligence taken
          from the captured slave to an officer in one of Stuart’s artillery
          companies—it was enough to convince the Union Cavalry commander
          that Lee was headed north, and it was enough to panic the peace-loving
          citizens of Harrisburg.  General
          Alfred Pleasonton dispatched his assessment of the situation to General
          Seth Williams in the War Department in Washington at four-thirty p.m.
          on Wednesday afternoon. General Williams was reading it by nine o’clock
          that evening. News of the threatened invasion reached Harrisburg overnight
          and was buzzing in the ears of Harrisburg residents by daylight on
          Thursday.  The
          situation seemingly grew direr with each passing hour, as the rumors
          were passed from one person to the next, or shared among fretful knots
          of men standing on the street corners. “The air of the city was
          full of portents,” reported one newspaper, “and rumors
          flitted about like flies in twilight.”101 An
          initial story had “four thousand rebels…within four days’ march” of
          the Pennsylvania State Capital. Within a few retellings, the size of
          the enemy force had increased tenfold to forty thousand soldiers under
          the direct command of General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson,
          and they were “within ten miles of the city.”102  That
          the enemy could not only traverse four days’ worth of countryside
          in a few hours, but do so under a resurrected general who had been
          dead for a month illustrates the terror that gripped many of Harrisburg’s
          residents at just the hint of a Southern invasion. A number of local
          men were in a “stage of demoralization” at hearing the
          stories, and more than a few took comfort at the corner of local beer
          shop.103  Although
          the stories about an imminent invasion were all discounted as dangerous
          rumors by the city editors, alert citizens noticed the arrival that
          evening of a military man, former Second Corps commander Darius N.
          Couch, at the Pennsylvania Railroad Depot. Couch had just accepted
          command of the recently created Department of the Susquehanna, and
          he intended to manage it from an office in the Capitol.  Arriving
          at seven-thirty p.m. on a connection with the Northern Central Railroad,
          Major General Couch was met on the platform along Market Street by
          Simon Cameron, the influential Harrisburg politician who was temporarily
          between political assignments, having just resigned his post as Minister
          to Russia. Couch’s welcoming committee also included Colonel
          Thomas A. Scott, Vice-President of the Pennsylvania Railroad, former
          Assistant Secretary of War, and a close friend of Cameron, and John
          A Wright, another well-connected railroad man.  Pennsylvania
          Governor Andrew Gregg Curtin had arrived in Harrisburg the previous
          night, from an extended stay in Philadelphia, and military authorities
          had secured permission from him for Major General Couch to establish
          his headquarters in the Executive wing of the Capitol. The four men—Couch,
          Cameron, Scott, and Wright—climbed into a waiting carriage as
          railroad porters loaded the general’s baggage, and they drove
          the few blocks to the Capitol, from which Darius Couch would manage
          the defense of Central Pennsylvania from fast approaching Confederate
          troops.104  The
          next morning, General Couch was informed that there were no troops
          available for the defense of the midstate. It was an incredible situation,
          considering that Harrisburg was the location of the North’s largest
          military camp of rendezvous, at Camp Curtin, yet it was all too true.
          Most of the thousands of soldiers who had enriched Harrisburg’s
          merchants and plagued its African American residents a few weeks earlier
          had been returning Nine-Months men who were now long since mustered
          out and returned home. Any other active units in camp had since shipped
          out to join the rest of the Army of the Potomac as it tried to outmaneuver
          the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and stay between it and the
          national capital at Washington.  The
          problem, though, was that Confederate commander Robert E. Lee had shifted
          his sights northward, eyeing the fertile farmlands and pastures of
          Pennsylvania. The farmers of Virginia, after two years of brutal war,
          had suffered terribly. Their fields had been trampled down by troop
          movements and scorched by battles, their livestock had been appropriated
          by hungry soldiers, and their fence rails burned for campfire fuel.
          If they were to harvest anything this fall, it was imperative that
          they be spared another summer of constant warfare. Pennsylvania’s
          farmlands, on the other hand, were fertile, lush, heavy with crops,
          and untouched by war. General Lee felt it was about time the people
          of the Keystone State experienced the effects of the war on their own
          soil.  More
          importantly, an invasion of Pennsylvania represented an important strategic
          objective. The factories and foundries of its large cities, the coal
          from its anthracite and bituminous ranges, and the lumber of its northern
          forests all supported the Northern war effort. A quick strike into
          the heartland of the state would paralyze the vital transportation
          network that was the State Works, and leave the invader poised to move
          west to Pittsburgh, and thereby threaten Ohio, or east to Philadelphia,
          and threaten both New York and Washington. Either one of these moves
          would panic the Pennsylvania gentry and strengthen the peace Democrats
          throughout the North, possibly forcing Washington to negotiate for
          a truce. A bold move into Pennsylvania, as envisioned by the Confederate
          high command, might just bring a quick end to the war.  Harrisburg,
          with its rail and canal connections, military camp and stores, bridges
          and turnpikes, as well as its distinction of being the capital of a
          key Northern state, was a tempting target, something recognized by
          General Couch as well as by Governor Curtin. With Confederate troops
          known to be moving north along the western side of the South Mountain
          Range, Couch knew that he had precious little time, should they cross
          the Potomac River, as the Rebels had a good two days’ start over
          the pursuing Union army. It was then that he was told that the only
          available troops were two companies of the Invalid Corps at York.105 The
          crisis was now on Harrisburg’s doorstep.    Previous |
            Next   Notes100. The
            War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the
            Union and Confederate Armies vol. 27, pt. 3 (Washington: GPO,
            1889), 48.  101. “Wars
          and Rumors of Wars,” Patriot and Union, 12 June 1863.  102.	Ibid.  103. Ibid. The
          newspaper editor may not have been exaggerating when he reported that
          local rumors had Stonewall Jackson at the head of an enemy column headed
          for Harrisburg. The legendary Southern general commanded so much respect
          during his lifetime that he remained a figure of dread to Northerners
          even after his death. Harrisburg residents learned of the death of
          Stonewall Jackson from newspapers published in town on the evening
          of 13 May 1863. A week later, on 21 May, the Patriot and Union published
          a humorous but revealing story from a Washington, D.C. trade paper
          under the title “Another Jackson Raid.” Upon hearing a
          newsboy crying out the headlines of “’Nother raid by Stonewall
          Jackson,” an excited passer-by exclaimed, “I thought Jackson
          was dead!” “Well, so he is; but his ghost is makin’ this ‘ere
          raid,” retorted the newsboy. “Another Jackson Raid,” Patriot
          and Union, 21 May 1863; Evening Telegraph, 13 May 1863.  104. Official
            Records, vol. 27, pt. 3, 55, 66, 68-69; Wilbur Sturtevant Nye, Here
            Come the Rebels! (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
            1965; repr., Dayton, OH: Morningside, 1988), 65; “Returned,” Daily
            Telegraph, 11 June 1863; Railroad timetables, Daily Telegraph,
            11 June 1863.  105. Official
            Records, vol. 27, pt. 2, 211; Miller, Training of an Army,
            157; Nye, Here Come the Rebels!, 151.
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